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Supply and demand conditions 
International sugar prices have recently followed a steady 
upward trend, moving from 12.1 US cents/pound in late 2008 to 
29.7 US cents/pound, which is the highest price in 25 years, in 
January 2011 before dropping to 23.91 US cents/pound in April 
2011. Domestic free market prices have fluctuated widely from 
Rs 17/kg in the first quarter of 2010 to Rs 50/kg in December 
2010 before declining to Rs 30/kg in May 2011. However, the 
levy sugar price (the administered price at which each sugar mill 
has to sell 10% of its sugar production to the government) is 
half that of free market sugar. As a result of higher free market 
prices, the beginning of the 2009/10 sugar season (September/
October) was marked by a number of ad hoc policy actions 
such as the imports of duty-free raw and refined sugar, stock 
limits for traders, a ban on sugar futures trading, the declaration 
of a higher Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) and a system 
for the fortnightly release of non-levy monthly sugar quota by 
mills. However, in April 2011 following a surplus production of 
sugar, the government of India decided to allow the export of 
0.5 MT (million tonnes) of raw, white and refined sugar under 
Open General License (OGL) and reintroduced the futures 
market in sugar. These ad hoc policies affected the long-term 
competitiveness of the sugar industry in India.
India’s sugarcane productivity has been stagnant at around 65 
tonnes/hectare (t/ha) for the past two decades. Cane production 
has averaged around 290 MT over the past decade (2001-2010): 
63% of this was used for sugar manufacturing, 22% for gur 1, 11% 
for seed and 3% for khandsari 2 (Table 1). The demand for cane 
to make gur and khandsari is stable year-on-year (low coefficient 
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of variation) compared with the demand for cane for centrifuged 
sugar. About 30% of sugar goes for domestic consumption 
and the remaining 70% is used by food processors such as 
bakeries, confectioners and soft drink manufacturers. Local sweet 
manufacturers consume most khandsari, while gur is mostly 
consumed in rural areas for household consumption. Khandsari 
and gur are mostly consumed within the same year of production, 
whereas sugar can be stored for a longer period.
The main source of fluctuation in sugarcane production is year-
to-year changes in acreage rather than in yield. Table 2 indicates 
that the good crop years from 2001 to 2003 were a result of the 
higher world prices since the early 2000s and stockpiles of sugar 
in excess of the domestic requirement (the normative closing 
stock requirement of keeping three months stocks is 7.6 MT). 
The subsequent two years of low sugar production reduced stock 
levels to below normal by 2006. During 2005/06 and 2007/08, 
higher production of sugar resulted in stockpiles rising above 9.2 
MT in 2007/08, before declining to 2.2 MT in 2009/10.
India was a frequent exporter of sugar to countries within Asia 
up until the 1980s. It became a net importer in the late 1990s 
and once again emerged as an exporter in 2010/11. India has 
the capability to produce sugar to meet global demand, although 
its cost competitiveness is questionable under the current highly 
regulated and highly unstable price environment. To assess 
the potential and importance of price policy on productivity 
and competitiveness of Indian sugar sector, this study has the 
following objectives: 
(i) to examine price trends of cane and sugar; 
(ii) to evolve a formulae for fixing cane price that takes into 
account both domestic costs and international price trends; 
(iii) to examine the link between the cost of production of cane 
and competitiveness; 
(iv) to assess profitability and consolidation in mills; 
(v) to investigate decontrol and deregulation; and 
(vi) to review policy options. The balance sheet data were collected 
from the Indian Sugar Mills Association from 1996 to 2010, the 
cost of the production of sugarcane and price data were collected 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and the data on sugar mills were 
collected from the Parliament (2010) question and answer website 
 Area  Yield  Production Recovery Cane used for making (%)
Year  (mln ha) (t/ha) (MT) % Sugar Khandsari Gur  Seed 
1985/86  2.90 60.0 174.0 10.0 39.7 6.0 41.1 13.1
1990/91  3.70 65.4 242.0 9.8 51.4 5.5 31.7 11.5
1995/96  4.20 68.0 285.6 9.8 62.2 3.5 23.6 10.7
2000/01  4.32 68.5 296.0 10.5 60.0 3.7 24.6 11.6
2001/02  4.41 67.4 297.2 10.3 60.8 3.5 23.8 11.8
2002/03  4.52 63.6 287.4 10.4 67.9 3.3 17.2 11.6
2003/04  3.94 59.4 233.9 10.2 59.1 4.3 26.5 10.1
2004/05  3.66 64.8 237.1 10.2 53.4 4.0 31.1 11.6
2005/06  4.20 67.0 281.2 10.2 66.5 3.0 17.9 12.6
2006/07  5.15 69.0 355.5 10.2 75.0 2.5 12.1 10.5
2007/08 5.06 68.8 348.2 10.6 72.6 2.0 16.2 9.2
2008/09 4.40 64.8 285.0 10.3 58.9 2.6 24.4 14.2
2009/10 4.30 63.9 274.7 10.3 59.9 2.6 24.1 13.4
Mean  
(2001-10) 4.40 65.7 289.6 10.3 63.4 3.2 21.8 11.7
CV % 10.2 5.1 13.9 1.4 25.7 18.8 17.6 12.9
Source: Indian Sugar Mills Association (2010)
Table 1. Basic production statistics of cane production and utilization
Particulars 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Open stocks 5.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 6.9 9.3 10.7 11.3 11.6 8.4 6.3 3.9 11.3 8.1 2.0
Production 16.5 12.9 12.9 15.5 18.2 18.5 18.5 20.1 14.0 13.0 19.1 28.2 26.3 14.8 18.5
Imports 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 5.0 6.5
Availability 22.1 20.8 20.4 22.2 25.5 27.8 29.2 31.5 26.2 23.4 26.1 32.1 37.6 27.9 27.0
Consumption 13.1 13.8 14.7 15.2 16.1 16.2 16.8 18.4 17.5 17.1 18.5 19.5 22.5 23.0 24.0
For exports 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.5 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.3 5.0 2.8 0.0
Net exports  1.0 0.4 -0.9 -1.0 -0.3 1.0 1.1 1.5 -0.3 -2.0 0.7 1.3 5.0 -2.2 -6.5
Source: Indian Sugar Mills Association (2010); Note: 1996 indicates for sugar season 1995/6
Table 2. Cyclicality in supply and demand for sugar in India (MT)
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Cane and sugar price trends
The determination of Statutory Minimum Price (SMP) or FRP for 
cane is influenced by both economic and political factors. The 
SMP/FRP almost doubled during the past decade from Rs 621/t 
in 2001/02 to Rs 1391/t in 2010/11. For 2009/10, the government 
announced an FRP instead of an SMP and fixed it at Rs 1298.4/t, 
which was 32% higher than the average cost of production (Rs 
873/t). In addition, most states announced that the State Advisory 
Prices (SAPs) at which mills had to procure the cane is above 
the SMP by a large margin. However, sugar mills procured the 
cane above the SAP to attract cane and increase production. 
For example, millers paid higher prices (between Rs 2100/t and 
2500/t) compared with an FRP of Rs 1292.8/t in 2009/10. From 
2003/04 to 2008/09, there was a nominal increase in the SMP 
every year. The low SMP regime reduced the burden on the 
government to pay millers for levy sugar at this lower price. The 
levy price index increased to just 121 in 2009/10 from 100 in the 
base year (2001/02). The intention to switch from the SMP to 
FRP was to provide remunerative pricing, which is substantially 
higher than the cost of production for cane, based on a cost-
plus approach. However, the FRP ignores both domestic and 
international free market prices. For example, the SMP/FRP index 
(224) has been much lower than that of the free market price index 
(272) over the past decade. This is also one of the reasons for the 
higher volatility in domestic sugar demand and supply conditions 
as well as the increase in free market prices. One of the reasons 
for the rise in the price paid by millers to farmers for cane and the 
free market prices of sugar is rising domestic demand because 
of higher incomes, population growth and growing international 
sugar prices on the demand side. On the supply side, high growth 
in cane prices is because of stagnant productivity and rising input 
prices such as wages (the input price index increased to 150 over 
the past decade). The high volatility of free market price reflects 
the flux in demand and supply over the years compared with the 
steady increase in levy sugar and cane prices. To reduce volatility 
in free market prices, administered prices need to be linked to 
both domestic and world market prices.
The index of the cane price paid by millers increased significantly 
(303) compared with the SMP/FRP index (224) and the input price 
index (150). This shows that in the past 10 years prices have moved 
in favour of farmers. In terms of the cost structure, the share of 
labour is higher (58%) than the cost of seed cane (19%), fertiliser 
(9%) and irrigation (7%). Most cane farmers have small farms (less 
than 2 ha) and are not extensively mechanised. 
The mismatch between cane and sugar prices also hinders the 
progress of the sugar industry. There is little link between the SMP/
FRP of cane and sugar prices, even though they affect the payment 
capacity of sugar mills, resulting in the accumulation of price 
arrears year-on-year. An examination of price arrears to be paid 
by mills to farmers revealed that whenever there is an increase in 
production, price arrears as a percentage of cane purchased from 
farmers increased and vice versa, resulting in the amplification of 
production cycles (Table 4). To smooth the production cycle, there 
should be a link between sugar and cane prices.
Linking the administered price (FRP) to market trends will not 
have an adverse impact on consumers, given the weight of sugar 
in the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) is only 3.6% and only about 
30% of sugar is for household consumption. Further, reforming 
the public distribution system (PDS), so that sugar required for 
PDS to be procured from free market instead of levy on millers 
and distribute to the poor households at the subsidised price 
will eliminate any adverse effects of price rise on consumers. 
With this in mind, a modified FRP* formulae is presented in the 
equation below. The first term is the cost of production of cane 
(which also includes a risk premium and normal profit) and the 
second term is an adjustment factor for changes in the index of 
international sugar price, which ranges between –1 and +1 and is 
free from the problem of skewness. The FRP* should be linked to 
a basic recovery rate of 9.5%.
Years Sugar  SMP/ Price paid by Price levy Free market Input  
 availability  FRP for mills for cane sugar price (Rs/t) price 
 (MT) cane (Rs/t) (Rs/t of cane) (Rs/kg) for sugar index
2001/02 29.2 621  925-1000 15.0 12850-16300 100
2002/03 31.5 695 695-1000 15.5 11470-15750 105
2003/04 26.2 730 730-1340 15.6 13200-15350 109
2004/05 23.4 745 745-1650 17.5 14100-18400 115
2005/06 26.1 795 795-1841 18.0 15500-19900 117
2006/07 32.1 803 1250-1300 18.0 11000-18300 118
2007/08 37.6 812 1300-1400 18.0 11400-14250 130
2008/09 (P) 27.9 812 1500-1550 18.0 17000-18000 134
2009/10 (P) 25.8 1298 2110-2500 18.0 30000-32000 142
2010/11 (E) 29.4 1391 2800-2900 20.0 35000-39000 150
Price index (2001/2=100) 100 224 303 121 272 150
Source: Indian Sugar Mills Association (2011): Note: p = provisional figures; E = estimates 
Table 3. Different prices trends in sugar complex
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This takes into account both the domestic cost of the 
production of cane and international price trends for sugar 
independent of efficiency in sugar factories. Hence, it will act 
as an incentive for sugar factories to improve efficiency and 
profitability and facilitate the consolidation of the industry based 
on efficiency and cost reduction. It will also reduce cyclicality, 
which helps in reducing price arrears. It will also eventually 
reduce the governmental cost of the management of the sugar 
economy. Bigger and more efficient sugar mills will enlarge their 
jurisdictions through mergers and acquisitions in the long run, 
and this will enable them to be internationally competitive. The 
larger and more efficient sugar mills bring stability to the sector 
and reduce the cyclicality in production with little government 
intervention. It is in line with price policies in other developing 
countries such as Brazil where cane prices are determined by a 
formula based on the end use, either sugar or ethanol. Formula-
based cane pricing should be implemented simultaneously with 
the complete decontrol of sugar prices. The political pressure 
from both farmers and millers would then be curtailed towards 
market-oriented prices.
Cost of production, opportunity cost, support price 
and competitiveness
Cost of cane represents 65-75% of the overall production 
cost of sugar. A cost/benefit analysis for sugarcane and its 
competing cropping systems (opportunity cost) for 2009/10 for 
three major cane growing regions is given in Table 5. Generally, 
in all regions, net returns from sugarcane are higher than they are 
from competing crops; however, sugarcane also requires higher 
investment. The margin is much higher in western India because 
sugarcane is irrigated, whereas competing crops are usually 
rainfed. In northern India, the cost of cultivation (Rs 40825/ha) and 
cost of production (Rs 740/ha) are lower and thereby the cost/
benefit ratio is higher (1.77) because of the short duration of the 
crop. However, cane yields are higher in western India (86.6 t/ha) 
and southern India (83.6 t/ha) compared with northern India (55.5 
t/ha). The higher cost/benefit ratio and abundant water in northern 
India suggests that it is a good candidate for expansion in cane 
production at the least cost.
Regulation, capacity utilization and profitability  
of mills 
Although sugar production has increasedsignificantly from 5 MT 
in 1980/81 to 26 MT in 2009/10, it is facing a crisis regarding 
its price policy. In the long run, on an average basis, even large 
sugar firms have struggled to generate a return on invested 
capital over and above their costs of capital (Rais, 1990). This 
is primarily because of high government regulation from raw 
material supply to final consumption. In the current scenario, 
industry has the potential to meet the large and growing domestic 
and international sugar demand. 
The installed capacity of all sugar mills is about 23.9 MT, but 
actual production was about 26.3 MT in 2007/08, 15.0 MT in 
2008/09 and 18.5 MT in 2009/10 (Parliament, 2010). Production 
was higher than installed capacity in 2007/8 because of the 
increase in crushing duration (days of operation of sugar mills/
year). Average crushing duration varies from 150 days (2007/08) 
to 104 days (2008/09). The capacity counts only in the years 
of surplus production. Because of the increase in the average 
capacity of plants from 1394 Tonnes of Cane per Day (TCD) in 
1971 to 3694 TCD in 2009 (Table 6), the Mahajan Committee 
(1998) and KPMG (2007) recommended that the government 
should consider increasing the radial distance between sugar 
mills for cane reception from farms to 25 km from the existing 
norm of 15 km to address the problem of underutilisation.
During 2006/07 and 2007/08, increase in sugar production 
resulted in low sugar price that was uneconomical for millers. This 
led to a large accumulation of price arrears to be paid by millers 
to farmers. In 2008/09, because of a reduction in cane output, 
Year Price arrears Cane Sugar 
 (% of purchases) production  production  
  (MT) (MT)
2001/2 20.0 296.6 18.5
2002/3 27.0 286.2 20.1
2003/4 17.0 231.7 13.6
2004/5 4.0 239.4 12.7
2005/6 3.0 281.0 19.3
2006/7 16.0 358.8 28.2
Source: Parliament (2010)
Table 4. Price arrears (%) and sugar production trends 
  South India   Western India  North India 
 (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu) (Maharastra)  (Uttar Pradesh)
 Sugarcane Paddy-Maize Sugarcane Cotton Sugarcane Paddy-Wheat
Total cost (Rs/ha) 79049 52120 79950 24732 40825 43841
Gross returns (Rs/ha) 108473 79713 112456 24450 72066 65832
Net returns (Rs/ha) 29424 27593 32506 -282 31241 21991
Benefit cost ratio  1.37 1.53 1.41 0.99 1.77 1.50
Cost of production (RS/t) 960   920  740  
FRP (Rs/t) 1298   1298  1298  
Yield (t/ha) 83.6   86.6  55.5  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (2010)
Table 5. Cost benefit analysis of cane and competing cropping system (2009/10)
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the industry also suffered from the underutilisation of capacity 
and increased costs of production. Out of 485 operational sugar 
mills, only a fifth have capacities of at least 2500 TCD, which 
is estimated to be the base economic viability in India.  Sugar 
factories in other leading sugar-producing countries operate in a 
range of 10,000 to 30,000 TCD. Tax incentives and profit sharing 
among employees, management and farmers will help in reducing 
costs and increasing efficiency. Shortage in cane supply, obsolete 
technologies, underutilisation, poor financial performance and high 
government regulation are some of the chronic problems resulting 
in a high cost of production and persistent losses (KPMG, 2007). 
The number of non-functioning mills rose from 119 in triennium 
ending (TE) 2005 to 162 in TE 2009 (Table 7).
Studies have found that profitability, short-term market 
position and capacity utilisation can significantly discriminate 
between functioning and non-functioning sugar mills (Rais, 1990). 
Net profit/working capital and the interest coverage ratio are the 
best discriminators for functioning units, which are directly related 
to the cane price policies.
In India, out of 634 sugar mills, 318 are in the cooperative 
sector, 254 in the private sector and 62 in the public sector. 
Almost one-quarter (23.7%) are non-operating, of which 26.1% 
are in the cooperative sector, 66.1% are in the public sector and 
10.2% are in the private sector (Table 8). The higher proportion of 
non-operating units in the public sector and cooperatives may be 
because of the highly regulated environment, uneconomical size 
and lack of profit motives. 
Large scale millers (both public and private) are better placed 
to profit from new revenue streams such as bagasse-based 
power generation and biofuels production if the industry is 
deregulated, facilitating access to cheaper funds through initial 
public offering, external commercial borrowing and rights issues. 
Combination of competition for cane, increasing overheads and 
capitalizing on revenue opportunities from biofuel and power 
production has  increased the need for consolidation in the sugar 
industry. However, the necessary market infrastructure in terms 
of roads, transport facilities and institutional development for 
ethanol and power purchases does not exist in many states and 
needs to be improved. 
Consolidation and efficiency 
Many large private companies (e.g. Balrampur Chini, Bajaj 
Hindusthan and Sri Renuka Sugars) with large capacities and 
multiple plants have consolidated through mergers in recent years 
(Damodaran, 2009). The main driving force for consolidation is 
to secure greater bargaining power compared with farmers and 
state governments and to cogenerate power and produce ethanol 
rather than simply enhancing capacity. In the past, there have been 
frequent and destructive ‘cane wars’ as mills were established too 
close to each other. At present, a cane area is reserved for a sugar 
factory mainly based on its crushing capacity. No regard is paid 
to the recovery rate in the factory. However, the SMP for cane is 
linked to the recovery rate. The cane growers of high-recovery sugar 
factories receive higher prices and vice versa. Many sugar factories 
continue to have recovery rates below 8.5% mainly because of their 
obsolete machinery. Modernisation has not progressed despite 
the availability of assistance by the sugar development fund. 
Furthermore, most mills have undertaken little cane development 
work in their allotted areas. One of the ways in which sugar factories 
can be encouraged to improve their recovery rates is to establish 
cane reservation areas, inter-alia, based on the recovery rate of the 
factory. Thus, an efficient factory with a high recovery rate should 
preferentially have access to larger cane acreage than an inefficient 
factory whose recovery rate is less. Such a move would stimulate 
factory modernisation and cane development.
Given the projected growth in domestic and international 
markets, India would need to produce a total of 32 MT of sugar 
by 2017 to meet demand (KPMG, 2007). This can be achieved 
through both productivity improvements and higher recovery 
rates without even increasing cane acreage. By adopting the 
appropriate production technology and applying latest research 
products, cane farmers can easily increase yields by 20% and 
factories improve their recovery rates by 50 basis points by 
Year No. of factories Crushing  Actual  
 working duration capacity 
  (days) (TCD)
1970/1 215 139 1394
1980/1 315 104 1718
1990/1 385 166 2088
2000/1 436 139 3080
2006/7 504 174 3474
2007/8 516 149 3546
2008/9 500 104 3694
Source: Parliament (2010)
Table 6. Sugar mill capacity utilization in India
State  Installed capacity (MT) Production (MT)  Capacity utilization (%) Number of  
             non-working  
             sugar mills
  2008 2009 2010 TE2010 2008 2009 2010 TE2010 2008 2009 2010 TE2010 TE 2005 TE 2009
UP 7.3 8.5 8.5 8.1 7.3 4.0 5.3 5.5 100 47 63 68 13 27
Maharashtra 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 9.1 4.4 5.1 6.2 126 61 71 86 50 37
South India 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 10.8 4.2 5.0 6.7 240 89 106 145 23 33
Other 6.8 7.0 7.0 6.9 8.8 2.4 3.1 4.8 129 34 45 69 33 65
India 22.5 23.9 23.9 23.4 26.3 15.0 18.5 19.9 117 63 77 85 119 162
Source: Parliament (2010) 
Table 7. Capacity utilization in sugar industry 
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2017 (IISR, 2008). This would enable the sector to produce 
an additional 8.2 MT of sugar. Water management is another 
key focus area since sugarcane is a water-intensive crop. The 
adoption of drip irrigation would increase water productivity in 
cane cultivation. In order to crush the additional cane, crushing 
capacity would need to be increased by 0.46 million TCD by 2017 
(KPMG, 2007), which could be met through an increase in the 
capacity utilisation of existing mills.
 
Deregulation of the sugar industry
The perishable nature of cane, the need for immediate processing, 
small-scale farming and the need to protect consumers’ interests 
are some of the justifications for government regulation. Hence, 
some regulations such as land demarcation for mills need to be 
continued, although considerable scope for deregulation exists in 
line with the Mahajan Committee Report (1998) recommendations. 
The full decontrol of sugar prices should be coupled with the 
removal of the levy sugar quota and monthly release schedules 
with free international trade. The committee also recommended 
that the required quantity of sugar distributed under a PDS for poor 
households should be purchased from the open market through 
tenders. However, the government is implementing a deregulation 
program in a phased manner: first through the reintroduction of 
futures trade in January 2011 and the reduction of the quota on 
levy obligation on sugar factories to 10%. The Committee on the 
Revitalization of the Sugar Industry (Tuteja Committee Report, 
2004) has suggested scrapping the release mechanism for the free 
sale of sugar but this recommendation has not yet been accepted. 
The futures market can also help in price discovery in open 
market and transmit world sugar price signals to Indian producers 
and consumers to help plan their production and consumption 
strategies. The Abhijit Sen Committee Report (2008) pointed out 
that the daily price volatility of the WPI has been reduced from the 
pre-futures (2002 to 2004) volatility of 10.8% to 8.2% in the post-
futures period (2004 to 2007). Even though the data are for a short 
period, we can conclude that there is no evidence of an increase 
in price volatility after the introduction of futures trade in sugar, 
especially because it is a highly liquid commodity.
Policy options and conclusion
Even though liberalisation started in India in the 1990s, the 
sugar sector remains highly regulated today. It is imperative 
that it is decontrolled to unleash its hidden potential. Since cane 
is produced primarily in nine states but cane-based products 
are consumed across the country, uniform policies should be 
adopted across states. Moreover, for a sustainable price band 
to be effective across the country it is necessary that cane and 
sugar prices reflect market conditions across states. Furthermore, 
being a highly traded commodity, domestic prices should also 
reflect international prices. The recent conflict following the 
announcement of the FRP is an example of the adverse effects 
of high political intervention in price fixing, which has little 
economic reasoning. Different types of subsidies/incentives are 
practiced in different states and such distortions interfere with 
free competitive forces. There is a need for the centre to evolve 
uniform price policy for the industry across the country. In the 
long run, cane prices should be remunerative for farmers and 
also within the capacity of sugar mills to pay for, and the long 
run sugar prices should give normal profits to mills and within the 
reach of consumers. Governments should allow sugar sector to 
evolve with limited controls and along with appropriate regulatory 
framework. Keeping this in mind, the paper developed a modified 
fair and remunerative price (FRP*) formula which reflects both 
domestic cost structure of cane and world prices of sugar. 
Major regulatory reforms needed, include (i) the cane payment 
system that is fair to both millers and growers, (ii) millers able to 
purchase cane from farms up 25 km away, (iii) discontinuation of 
levy sugar and the requirements of the PDS should be purchased 
from the free market. 
Endnotes
1 Gur: a crude non-centrifugal sugar in lump form produced using 
the open pan evaporation method.
2 Khandsari sugar: a low recovery centrifugal sugar prepared 
using the open-pan evaporation method.
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